How the Gaza War Could Make China a Regional Mediator
ITALIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES
Until October 7, 2023, China’s presence in the Middle East could be characterised as predominately economic, with marginal influence over regional conflicts. However, over the past year, China has attempted to flex its muscles as a conflict mediator. While still far from becoming a major player in regional security, Beijing’s recent efforts reflect its multi-level approach that connects its regional actions to its broader global strategy. Specifically, China has approached the war in Gaza and its escalation as part of a wider global rivalry with the United States. Moreover, the confrontation in the Middle East [PM1] may serve as the principal mean through which China can secure its regional economic interests, increasingly at risk due to the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict – as well as its spillover into other areas, including Iran and its proxies, like the Houthis in the Red Sea and Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as Iran itself.
China’s first response in the wake of Hamas’s surprise attack on October 7 was perceived as a slight against Israel. Indeed, Beijing’s initial statements expressed concern over the escalation of tension and violence but failed to condemn Hamas. Israeli officials quickly seized on this, concluding that China was not a friendly or reliable actor and potentially undoing years of largely cordial diplomatic relations between the two.
However, although Beijing’s statement offended Israel, its true target audience was elsewhere. China’s position was more about putting distance between itself and the United States, which provided both diplomatic and material support to Israel. The aim was to present itself as a counterweight to US influence and policy, especially as Israel attracted criticism over the disproportionate violence and humanitarian toll of its Gaza campaign, while Washington demonstrated little will or capacity to rein Israel in.
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