ISHTAR MENA ANALYTICS

Since the 1980s, the main concept of the Chinese foreign policy was Deng Xiaoping’s formula “hide your ambitions and disguise your claws”. It meant that beyond Asia and the Pacific, Beijing was completely focused on economic relations, trying to engage in political relations at a very minimal level. This is especially illustrative in the context of the MENA region: the traces of the PRC’s political involvement in the region in the 1980s are almost impossible to find. As China emerges as a global power, questions about whether this concept remains relevant started appearing in the late 2000s [1], and in the mid-2010s, this discussion has become more pertinent [2]. Along with this debate inevitably comes the question whether China could replace the US as a security guarantor in the MENA region [3]–[5].


Furthermore, as Guy Burton (BSoG professor) notes, “China's interests go beyond oil and gas to include large scale infrastructure projects (like the involvement in the construction of the new Egyptian capital) as well as Gulf states' efforts to diversify their economies”.

Speaking about FDI activity of China, Burton notes an important point: “this form of exchange is not a one-way road: especially in the case of the Arab Gulf states it's a two-way process, with Saudi and Emirati sovereign wealth funds and other companies looking to invest in China as well”. For instance, the equities’ portfolio of The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority in Chinese domestic shares is 1.4 billion of dollars as of the end of 2021 [13].

Moreover, as Burton notes, “it [cooperation of the above actors with the PRC] also shows their rivals that they are not the international pariahs as some in the West or in the region portray them. That said, this is a somewhat one-sided stand, since Chinese investment is more a promise than a reality for now”. Indeed, Syria and Iran weren’t even included into the above tables, as there is no official data about Chinese investments into these countries since 2020.

Burton takes the similar view [that China does not want to take on a more politically active role], but at the same time he adds that “it's [Chinese role in the MENA] certainly changing, but I think it's still the case that actual practice in terms of political involvement is lagging behind economic exchange. What is different from a few years ago is official awareness of the challenges posed by the region and the need for some Chinese reaction. But what that should mean is not fully developed; instead what you're seeing is discussions taking place in the periphery, among scholars and diplomats. But so far as I can see, it hasn't become a central government directive”.

Burton adds that “It has helped the Saudis counter American unwillingness to supply them with certain types of military equipment”.

TO ACCESS THE WHOLE ARTICLE, CLICK HERE.

Previous
Previous

Analysis on G20 summit and Biden-Xi meeting

Next
Next

Сближение ОАЭ и Китая на базе искусственного интеллекта [Rapprochement of the UAE and China based on artificial intelligence]